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THE OCEANS

THOMAS A. CLINGAN, JR.

Projessorof Law
University of Miami

CARACAS MEETING
In August, 1973, the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful
Uses of the Seabed and Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National
Jurisdiction concluded its preparatory work of the third international
Law of the Sea Conference. In October, the General Assembly of the
United Nations scheduled a two-part meeting for that Conference. The
first, an organizational meeting, to be held at the United Nations in
New York from December 3 to December 14, 1973. At that meeting,
questions of organization, membership, and voting would be discussed.
The second, substantive session of the meeting, has been scheduled to
take place in Caracas, Venezuela, from June 20 to August 29, 1974.
GENEVA REPORT
The preparatory work for LOS III has now been completed, at least
in the sense that the life of the Seabeds Committee has run out. The
last meeting at the end of August was greeted with mixed emotions. Most
nations appeared to sense a feeling of disappointment that more was
not achieved by way of narrowing the issues. But there were also feelings
of relief on the part of the few nations who would rather see no conference than a conference held along the lines trends seemed to be

indicating.
The Committee's objective was to prepare a series of draft articles

indicating, where possible, agreement on issues, and where agreement was
not possible, narrowing and making more precise the nature of the
disagreements in order that political choices between rational alterna.
tives could be made once the Conference begins.
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Because of the complexity of the issues and because of the manner
in which the Seabeds Committee was organized, there was limited agreement on treaty articles or alternatives. However, the ultimate conclusion
was that despite disappointing progress, the meeting should continue as
nearly on schedule as possible.
The purpose of this report is to review the progress made by the
Seabeds Committee, and to take a backward look at its organizational
difficulties. First, by way of review, the Committee organized itself into
three sub-committees. Each of these was given a basic area or areas of
investigation. Subcommittee I was charged with developing a regime and
machinery for the seabed area beyond the limits of national jurisdiction,
wherever those limits might be established. It carried out its mandate by
creating a working Group (known as Working Group I), and several
ad hoc drafting groups and other units as needed. The Second Subcommittee, and its Working Group of the Whole dealt with problems of the
territorial sea, international straits, archipelagoes, continental shelf resources, fisheries, and other related subjects. Subcommittee III was
divided into Groups to deal with problems of the marine environment
(Working Group 2), and Marine scientific research (Working Group 3).
The major difficulty throughout the considerations of the Seabed
Committee was, ironically, its potential strength. Decisions were taken by'
consensus, meaning that each nation had the veto power. Such a rule of
procedure clearly places heavy demands upon the skill and patience of
the chairman of each group, but once decisions arc taken, the rule assures
broad agreement. Since there is a growing feeling that a new convention
on the Law of the Sea must have broad acceptability if it is to be truly
effective, the consensus rule is a good approach for the purposes of preparatory work.
The greatest progress during the summer meetings appeared to be
achieved in Subcommittee I with regard to a deep seabed regime. Perhaps
the basic reason for this was that this subject did not require the members
to come to grips with the difficult and vexing problems of jurisdiction.
The work began with the understanding that the area being discussed.
was beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, wherever that line might
occur. There were no formal negotiations of a substantive nature, however, the Committee, through its Subcommittee and drafting groups was
able to prepare alternative articles utilizing bracketed language where
needed to show that there were differing points of view. Chairman Paul'
Engo of Cameroon attempted on several occasions to encourage delegations,
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to discard or limit technical discussions in favor of broader substantive
negotiations on the issues, but most nations seem to feel that the task of
the Committee was better served by drafting alternatives which would
narrow the areas of disagreement to the maximum extent, leaving substantive negotiations for the conference itself.
While many draft articles achieved a second reading, certain basic
areas of disagreement were still present, and were highlighted during the
discussions. The most basic of these concerned the relative powers of
bodies of an international authority. While all nations agreed that there
should be a broadly based international authority for the governance of
the area of the seabeds beyond national jurisdiction, there was disagreement on the functions of its constituent parts or executive body. Some
nations, perhaps expressing the predominant view, felt that the effective
power in the new organization should rest in the Assembly, where all
parties would receive an equal vote. The developed countries were uniform
in their view that the Council should play the primary role, with a
weighted voting system designed to protect the heavy investment those
nations might be making in the oceans. Under this view the assembly
would have a recommendatory role.
A further difference of opinion arose with regard to the system for
resource exploitation within this area. Early in the session, the Latin
American States introduced a proposal embodying the enterprise concept.
Under this system, there would be established an operating enterprise
within the authority exclusively empowered to exploit the seabed of the
area either directly or through joint ventures and contracts. The opposing
point of view generally favored a licensing authority, rather than an
enterprise. The basic differences between the two would be that under the
licensing system, any qualified operator meeting international standards
would have the right to exploit, while under the enterprise system that
power remains with the enterprise itself. While disagreement on this issue
was apparent, it was equally apparent that fruitful discussions were taking
place as to how these concepts might be brought closer together.
Another issue regarding the deep seabeds centered on price and production controls. There was fear on the part of some nations that uncontrolled exploitation of deep seabed hard mineral deposits could prejudice
the economic position of certain mineral exporting developing nations.
One of the most difficult issues in the negotiation will clearly be that
of the composition of the Council. There is at this stage no sign of
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concession on how the Council should be structured, and the working
group passed over the question simply setting forth a set of alternatives
for further use.
With regard to the work of Subcommittee II, the most difficult issues
were those related to the territorial seas, resources within national jurisdiction, and straits. One block of nations clearly expected broad territorial
seas, i.e., 200 miles. But this was a minority view. Most nations were will.
ing to accept a universal limit to territorial seas of 12 miles, although
some would condition their acceptance on agreement to one or another
qualification. For example, the U.S. conditioned their acceptance on agreement to freedom of transit through and over international straits. The
supporters of the Santo Domingo Declaration would accept 12 miles if
linked to a special economic zone or patrimonial sea. The general support
for a 12-mile limit indicated that these issues will be negotiable.
The question whether straits used for international navigation should
receive special treatment from other areas of the sea is still, however,
under debate. Major maritime powers continued to stress the need for a
right of passage through such waters, but many others felt that the
existing regime of innocent passage would be adequate protection. The
majority of States, however, remain silent on the issue. Affecting both
the straits issue and the breadth of the territorial seas was the position
of the archipelago States. The Philippines, Indonesia and Fiji continued
to press for a special regime for such groups of islands, permitting them
to enclose large areas of seas within their perimeters by drawing straight
baselines around the outermost islands. Regardless of the resolution of
this issue, island regimes continue to be a problem of their own. This
was one of the least understood problems during the summer discussions.
Some preferred the concept that islands should be entitled to the same
territorial seas and resource rights as mainland areas. Others would not.
Still others would differentiate between islands based upon their location,
size, population, and other similar factors.
With respect to coastal State resource jurisdiction beyond the limits
of the territorial seas, there seemed to be widespread support for some
kind of special economic resource zone, perhaps to a limit of 200 miles
or even more. The U.S. draft articles on the Coastal Seabed Economic
Area and the Patrimonial Sea concept are typical of the general principle, though there are wide variations in the details. Under the concept,
coastal nations would have the exclusive right to authorize and regulate,
at the minimum, non-living mineral resources within the zone subject to
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minimal international pollution standards. Nations disagreed, however,
whether living resources of a non-sedentary species should be included
within the regime.
There were basically two controversial issues in connection with
continental margin resources. The first had to do with the relationship
of the existing regime for the continental shelf and the new regime of the
economic resource zone. Some, such as the Latin American States supporting the Santo Domingo Declaration, felt that there should be a dual
regime. To a limit of 200 miles, the coastal State's rights would be controlled by the economic resource zone rules, while beyond that limit, the
continental shelf regime, as provided for in the 1958 Geneva Convention,
should apply. Others, however, were of the view that an outermost limit
of 200 miles should apply for all purposes. The U.S. took no position on
the outermost limit. The other issue involved the desire by landlocked
and other "geographically disadvantaged" States to share in or have
access to the resources of their neighboring states.
With respect to fisheries, most nations seem to favor a zonal approach,
allowing the coastal State jurisdiction over its living resources to a fixed
distance-most frequently suggested to be 200 miles. The U.S. continued
its support for a species approach, emphasizing the need for maximum
utilization of all popular stocks. This concept would assure distant water
fishing fleets of other nations the right to utilize stocks of fish within the
jurisdiction of a coastal State if that state was unwilling or unable to do
so. Presumably, allocation of such unused stocks would be to foreign
fleets based upon a historical rights concept. Some nations, however, such
as Japan, the USSR, and the U.K. continued to advocate distant water
fishing rights in general. The U.S. further continued to press for special
rights for the coastal State for anadromous fish stocks, and for international, as opposed to coastal State, authority over highly migratory fish.
There was a great deal of debate on fisheries problems, but no draft
alternatives were adopted by Subcommittee II.
In Subcommittee III, there was again a major split on the issues of
importance. With regard to pollution, the majority of interested States
split on the question of coastal State vs. international authority. The
United States, spokesman for one point of view, stressed the importance
of universal, exclusively international pollution standards for ships, no matter how strict. Canada, on the other hand, urged that coastal States be
permitted to exercise jurisdiction to protect their own special interests,
noting problems in the arctic areas as examples. It was Canada's view
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that the coastal State should be competent to prescribe rules and to enforce
them. The United States, on the other hand, took the position that standards should be internationally prescribed, and enforcement should be
permitted only by flag States and port States. There was no narrowing
of areas of disagreement on these issues. Some nations also voiced concern
over the economic implication of pollution controls. There appeared to be
a strong desire on the part of developing countries to build in exceptions
to environmental standards which might restrict economic development.
Finally, there was a great deal of concern over the nature of the body
most appropriate for establishing standards for vessel source pollution.
IMCO, the most frequently mentioned body, came under heavy attack
on the ground that its Council was heavily influenced by the maritime
nations of the world.
Scientific research questions also polarized in Working Group 3. On
the one hand, many nations felt that scientific research should not be
conducted within the area to be known as a special economic zone (at
least 200 miles), without the prior consent of the coastal state. This concept would be an extension of the regime of the continental shelf regard.
ing research. The USSR was in strong opposition to the consent regime,
while the Peoples Republic of China favored not only such a regime in
the economic resource zone, but perhaps in the area previously known as
the high seas as well. The United States recognized the traditional rights
of sovereignty of coastal States within territorial seas, but suggested a
different kind of regime for science in the economic resource zone. Under
this proposal, research vessels would be required to meet certain criteria
regarding publication of results, participation by the coastal State, sharing
of data and samples, notification, pollution protection and the like. Once
a vessel was certified as representing a qualified institution in purely
scientific research and had met the criteria, no consent within the economic resource zone would be required. Along with scientific research
in ocean space, countries frequently raised questions regarding the transfer of marine technology. However, formal discussions of technology
transfer were vague and poorly structured.
Finally, during the closing days of the summer session, the subject
of dispute settlement was raised. The United States tabled a set of draft
articles calling for the establishment of a Law of the Sea Tribunal with
final binding jurisdiction. This would not preclude settlement of disputes
by negotiation, good offices, mediation, inquiry, or conciliation. However,
any party to a dispute could call for mandatory settlement by the tribunal
at any stage of the dispute. Further, the tribunal would have jurisdiction
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to grant emergency relief where justified. This might be, for example,
in the case of a vessel unduly detained by a coastal State. The articles
were tabled at such a late date, that an informed judgment on how they
were received is impossible. It can be said, however, that a number of
States felt that the concept of compulsory settlement is inconsistent with
the traditional principle of equality of sovereigns.
This very summary discussion of the complex issues above indicates
the wide lack of solid agreement on any issue. In that sense, the meeting
was discouraging. However, in two respects, the meeting may be said
to lead to hope. In the first instance, more national positions with respect
to the issues were made public than ever before, indicating accelerating
interest in seeking a settlement. Secondly, there was general feeling that
further meetings of the Seabeds Committee would probably be little more
productive than the last two, and this might suggest that there is no point
holding any other meeting except for hard political negotiations.
SHIP POLLUTION
On November 2, 1973, an international conference on marine pollution sponsored by the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO), signed a new Convention on Pollution from Ships designed
to supplant previous such conventions. The documentation consists of the
text of the Convention itself, five annexes, and two protocols.
The Convention itself, which becomes effective twelve months after
not less than fifteen States, the combined merchant fleets of which constitute not less than fifty percent of the gross tonnage of the world's shipping have become parties, contains the basic rules applying to all forms
of vessel source pollution. It applies to all ships entitled to fly the flag of
a party to the Convention, or those which operate under the authority of
a party, except for warships, naval auxiliaries, and other governmentowned non-commercial vessels. Violations of requirements of the Convention are prohibited and both the Administration (the government under
whose authority the ship is operating) and a party having jurisdiction
over the vessel may take action to enforce the rules. Vessels will be
required to hold a certificate verifying that they meet convention requirements, and port States will have the power to inspect to see if these
requirements are met while in ports or at offshore terminals. For violations, the Administration shall take action, while if the violation takes
place within the jurisdiction of another State, the State having jurisdiction
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may act or request the Administration to act. A provision also requires
penalties under the law of a party to be adequate to discourage violations
of the Convention. The Convention further places liability on a State for
loss or damage suffered for undue delay to ships. While the treaty expressly supersedes the 1954 Convention, as amended, it is made clear that
nothing in the Convention should prejudice codification and development
of the law of the sea now scheduled for Caracas this summer. This is
particularly so with respect to jurisdictional issues. It is also of interest
that an article adopted in committee with respect to the right of a coastal
State to adopt higher than Convention standards in situations where the
environment is exceptionally vulnerable did not receive the necessary
two-thirds majority in plenary for inclusion in the treaty.
Of the five annexes, the first two are compulsory for signatories,
while the last three are optional. Annex 1 contains regulations for the
prevention of pollution by oil. This annex tightens regulations for the
discharge of oil, and spells out requirements in more detail than ever
before. Special requirements are set out for special areas where more
stringency is needed. The only exceptions permitted are discharges for
the purpose of securing the safety of a ship or saving a life at sea, or
discharges resulting from damage to a ship or its equipment if reasonable
safety precautions had been taken. The annex also deals with the provision of reception facilities in ports of call, segregation of oil and water
ballast, retention of oil on board, oil discharge monitoring and control
systems, and other technical requirements necessary to implement the
objectives of the treaty.
Annex II deals with regulations for the control of pollution by noxious
liquid substances in bulk. For purposes of regulation, such substances are
listed in four categories. Category A consists of liquid substances which,
if discharged into the sea, would present a major hazard to marine resources or human health. Category B includes those substances which
would present a hazard only. Category C liquids would present a minor
hazard, and Category D substances would present a recognizable hazard.
The ensuing regulations are structured with the various categories in
mind, rules for Category A liquids being the most stringent. The same
exceptions apply to discharges of these materials as for oil and oily
substances.
Annexes III; IV, and V are optional annexes, and may be adhered
to singly, all together, or not at all by individual parties to the Convention. Annex III contains regulations for the prevention of pollution by
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harmful substances carried in packaged forms, freight containers, portable
tanks or road ,and rail tank wagons. Annex IV deals with the prevention
of pollution by sewage from ships, and Annex V regulates the prevention
of pollution by garbage from ships.
The first protocol contains regulations concerning reporting on incidents involving -harmful substances. It lays out the duty to report, the
methods of reporting, and the contents of a report. Protocol 2 provides
an arbitration procedure to be applied to the settlement of disputes unless
the parties choose another method. The decisions of the three man arbitral
body are final and binding.
About six hundred and fifty delegates from seventy-nine countries
attended the conference in England. At the final vote, sixty-eight voted
in favor, none against, and three abstained. The most controversial annex
dealing with construction stipulates that all new tankers over 70,000
deadweight for which building contracts are placed subsequent to December 31, 1975 must be fitted with segregated ballast tanks. The resulting
loss in cargo carrying capacity could mean an increase of operating
costs in addition to construction costs.

COLOMBIA -

VENEZUELA

The controversy between the two countries relating to the limits of
the Gulf of Venezuela remains unresolved. High level contacts, even at
the presidential level, have failed to break the impasse in spite of the
reiteration by both parties that an amicable solution to the dispute
should be found through direct negotiations. Indicative of the sensitivity
of the subject and the desire not to bring the issue into high profile
was its absence as a campaign issue from the presidential election on
December 9, 1973. Nevertheless, the issue remains a deep one between
the two countries, recently grown in importance in the light of the worldwide energy crisis.
"HAZARDOUS WATERS"
The waters between the United States, the Bahamas and Cuba have
again become "active" as charges and countercharges are filed by fishermen, and sometimes governments, for damages done to fishing vessels
in international waters. Factors contributing to the recurring tension,

LAWYER OF THE AMERICAS

among others, are contested fishing rights, the activities of Cuban exiles
in Miami and governmental foreign policies, all of which have made the
waters in question a potential hazard to those pursuing legitimate interests
therein. As a means of self protection some of the fishing vessels now
carry heavy weapons and unfortunately some shooting incidents and
woundings have occurred.

PERU'S FISHING FACILITIES
Peru's Ministry of Fisheries is deeply involved in a program to upgrade the fishing industry through the construction of port facilities,
fishing vessels, processing plants and distribution centers. For example,
about $35 million is being spent at the port of Paita where Peru, Japan,
the Soviet Union and private industry are participating in new construction and improvement of existing facilities.
Peru is also engaged in its own boat building program. Besides
constructing vessels for its own fishing fleet, Peru has built twenty
vessels for Cuba and four for France.

CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY
A Meeting of a Ministerial Committee on the Law of the Sea and
Related Matter was held at the Caribbean Community Secretariat in
Georgetown, Guyana, on the 21st of November, 1973.
The Ministerial Committee, which has met several times, was first
established by a Decision of the Sixth Heads of Government Conference
held in Jamaica in April, 1970 for the purpose of harmonizing the positions of Commonwealth Caribbean countries on questions to be discussed
at the forthcoming United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea.
This Conference will seek to formulate a new International Convention
governing the ownership and exploitation of the ocean space and its
resources on a global level. The Ministerial Committee therefore directed
its attention to the adoption of a regional approach to this Conference
and to organizational aspects of preparations. The Committee also gave
consideration to reports on developments on the Law of the Sea over
the past year at Meetings of a Standing Committee of Regional Officials
on this subject as well as in Latin America and United Nations' forums.
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OFF-SHORE DRILLING
It is believed that up to one hundred billion barrels of recoverable
oil now lie buried beneath the waters off the eastern coast of the United
States. Research activity by oil companies and the Department of the
Interior have diagnosed three areas of particular promise; The Blake
Plateau Basin, beginning 150 miles off the northern half of Florida;
the Baltimore Canyon Basin, forty miles off Maryland, Delaware and
New Jersey; and the Georges Bank Basin between Long Island and
Cape Cod.
This potential oil and gas deposit has not escaped the attention of
the governments (Federal and State), the oil industry, the conservationists, and the general public, whose interests in the matter are now
accentuated by the nation's energy problems. Some of the specific issues
raised in connection with off-shore drilling are the conservationsists desire
to prevent pollution threats to the sea and the shorelines; the concern of
private parties with property values; the oil industry's preoccupation
with the exhaustion of oil reserves in land outside of Alaska; and the
federal government's oil import policies, among others. Also complicating
the problem is the dispute between the federal and certain Eastern state
governments regarding the continental shelf. The federal government holds
that state jurisdiction over the continental shelf is limited to the three mile
limit while the states concerned claim jurisdiction as far as 200 miles
(5 Law. Am. 641,1973).

